In 1993, a group of national forest stakeholders, the Quincy Library Group, crafted a proposal that intended to reduce wildfire risk, protect the California spotted owl (Strix occidentalis occidentalis), restore watersheds, and enhance community stability by ensuring a predictable supply of timber for area sawmills and biomass for energy plants. The Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act of 1998 codified this proposal, directing the USDA Forest Service to conduct forest treatments on 40,000 -60,000 acres per year by creating defensible fuel profile zones and logging by group-and individual tree-selection methods. The law also designated an Independent Science Panel to review monitoring studies, administrative studies, and research to assess efficacy of the implementation and achievement of goals. Although several goals were achieved, implementation fell short of treatment and volume goals, and evidence was lacking to make conclusive judgments about environmental impacts. Shortcomings were due to differing interpretations of the Act's prescriptive intent, changes in management direction, compounding economic factors, appeals and litigation, variation in site-specific forest conditions, and variation in approaches among national forests and districts. Most notable was a lack of monitoring of the treatment effects on California spotted owl populations and other environmental concerns. These findings suggest that attempts to legislate prescriptive, collaboratively developed proposals may not account for the complex biophysical, management, social, and economic contexts within which national forest management occurs. These findings also suggest that current national forest policies and directives promoting collaboration should also be accompanied by a commitment to monitoring and adaptive management.
L egal and political conflicts over the management of western national forests in the early 1990s led to decreases in timber production to protect three spotted owl subspecies (California [Strix occidentalis occidentalis], Mexican [Strix occidentalis lucida], and Northern [Strix occidentalis caurina]) and other species associated with old-growth forests (Yaffee 1994) . Estimates of job losses and economic disruptions in rural areas with industries dependent on national forest timber (US Department of Agriculture [USDA] Forest Service 1992, US Department of the Interior 1992) prompted a small group of adversaries in Quincy, California, to collaborate on mutual actions for maintaining timber production while protecting forest ecosystems and owl populations. The Quincy Library Group (QLG) was born from this dialogue and included environmentalists, the forest products industry, local economic development organizations, and state and federal land management agencies from the area (Little 1995 , Marston 2001 . In August 1993, the QLG adopted a Community Stability Proposal recommending a 5-year program of work on national forestlands in northeastern California (Terhune and Terhune 1998) . The QLG Community Stability Proposal was intended to be a short-term strategy for maintaining a supply of timber to local sawmills while guidelines were being formulated for protecting the California spotted owl and old-growth forests.
This proposal was the basis for the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act of 1998 (hereafter, the "Act"), which established a pilot project (hereafter the "Project") on local area national forests. Specifically, the Act directed the USDA Forest Service to conduct forest treatments on 40,000 -60,000 acres per year by creating defensible fuel profile zones (DFPZs) and applying group-and individual tree-selection methods. Forest treatments were intended to promote the development of resilient forest conditions, protect spotted owl activity centers, and protect water and aquatic resources, while providing a sustainable flow of timber to local mills.
The Act was one of the first instances in which a proposal from a collaborative stakeholder group to influence federal land management was legislated into statute (Colburn 2002) . It set precedents for specificity of silvicultural prescriptions, acreage targets, and the magnitude of public financial investment (Owen 2002) . Although the QLG was celebrated for forging agreements among formerly opposing parties, it was also criticized for giving undue influence to a vocal, local minority of stakeholders who favored continued federal timber harvesting at a time when other policies and court orders were restricting such activities (Blumberg and Knuffke 1998 , McCloskey 1999 , Hibbard and Madsen 2003 .
The Act also required an independent Scientific Review Panel (hereafter "Panel," the authors of this paper) to evaluate the efficacy of the Project in meeting the goals of the Act [16 USC 2104 note, Pub. L. 105-277 § 401(k) (1) ]. This article summarizes our evaluation of the Project and examines implications for current and future laws and policies advancing collaborative proposals for national forest management.
Overview of the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act
The Act was introduced by Congressman Wally Herger (R-CA, 2nd District) in the US House of Representatives and Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) in the US Senate and was signed into law as part of the federal fiscal year 1998 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations bill (16 USC 2104 note, Pub. L. No. 105-277 § 401, 112 Stat. 2681-231) . The Act authorized the implementation of the Community Stability Proposal as a pilot project for 1.53 million acres of the Lassen and Plumas National Forests and the Sierraville Ranger District of the Tahoe National Forest in northeastern California (Figure 1 ). The Act was reauthorized twice to extend the Project time frame. Federal fiscal year (FY) 2012 was the final year of the Project.
Implementation of the Act began in FY1999 and was overseen by supervisors of the three national forests and administered by two staff teams, one for Project implementation and one for Project monitoring. Annual reports summarizing the previous year's treatments and accomplishments, funding and expenditures, and monitoring activities and results were submitted to Congress. 1 A total of $324.7 million was appropriated for the Project. After subtraction of administrative costs, $293.3 million was spent to treat 242,000 acres between FY1999 and FY2012.
Independent Science Review Panel and Review Methods
The Panel's interdisciplinary team were experts in fire and forest ecology and management, social science, wildlife biology, and watershed science convened by the Pinchot Institute for Conservation and were contracted by the Forest Service's Pacific Southwest Research Station to carry out the independent science review specified in the Act. The Panel used the program evaluation and reporting approach employed by the Government Accountability Office (2012) to accommodate the contract agreement to use existing data and information and to provide a report within a relatively short time. Evidence of performance was derived from two sources: data and reports generated by the Forest Service monitoring team 2 ; and research studies conducted by other organizations and individuals, including peerreviewed research and "gray" literature (publicly available non-peer-reviewed written reports). Following the Government Accountability Office framework, the Panel also sought to understand the contextual factors affecting Project implementation and outcomes by conducting interviews with agency personnel, QLG members, and individuals from organizations outside of the QLG who closely observed the Project.
In November 2007, the Panel visited Project sites in all forests. During the visit, interviews were conducted with the USDA Forest Service personnel responsible for oversight, implementation, and monitoring of Project activities. These included line officers (forest supervisors and district rangers), supervisor and district office staff assigned to the Project, and resource specialists. Also interviewed were active QLG participants, key environmental and industry stakeholders, local elected officials, and community leaders. Each group was questioned about the mechanics and execution of the Project. Panel meetings were held each day to discuss the interviews and to summarize results pertaining to implementation and outcomes. These meetings also provided insight into the social context of the Project (Gutiérrez et al. 2015) . The Forest Service was provided with an initial "phase I" report (Pinchot Institute for Conservation 2008). This report included the following: initial observations of the activities and impacts associated with the Project; a detailed discussion of deficiencies in Proj-
Management and Policy Implications
The Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act is one of the first modern examples of "place-based" legislation mandating national forest management prescriptions and acreage targets to stabilize forest products employment and businesses while reducing the risk of forest ecosystems to catastrophic wildfires and conserving imperiled species. However, differing interpretations of prescriptive intent by managers and stakeholders, changing management direction and economic conditions at regional and local scales, and variation in site-specific conditions and implementation approaches can confound full implementation of national policy mandates, leading to unrealized goals and unfulfilled expectations. The dynamic social, political, economic, and ecological contexts in which national forest management occurs require a degree of flexibility and adaptive management based on continuous assessment and monitoring involving a diverse range of stakeholders. Current and prospective place-based policies should include provisions and resources to support collaborative adaptive management and steer away from mandating management prescriptions and performance targets. ect monitoring we uncovered; and recommendations for addressing those deficiencies.
The Panel conducted a second site visit in March 2013 after the Project was completed to compile and review monitoring reports and research studies. The same individuals and groups interviewed in 2007 were targeted for a second interview, as were new individuals associated with the Project. For example, both current and past line officers were interviewed. There were two primary objectives for interviews. The first objective was for the Panel to understand the information in the final monitoring reports, includ-ing any changes made to methods and analyses since our previous visit. The second objective was to assess what was learned from the Project, including the degree to which community stability and ecological goals were achieved. To accomplish this objective, participants were asked their opinions about the specific goals of the Project (e.g., wildfire risk reduction, spotted owl recovery, riparian and watershed management, and economic stability). They were also asked about expenditures and priorities, the agency's management of the Project, and the role of place-based collaboration in influencing national forest management.
A hierarchical framework composed of goals, objectives, and indicators was used to facilitate the organization and evaluation of the information compiled by the Panel (for details, see Pinchot Institute for Conservation 2013). Goals were defined as statements of broad intent and aspirations without any quantitative metrics. Objectives for each goal were derived from the QLG's Community Stability Proposal, the Act, and the Pacific Southwest Research Station's request for proposals. Objectives included quantitative metrics, such as acres treated over the life of the Project and cost per acre. Indicators were discrete attributes or variables that could be measured or described. Indicators for each objective were based on the monitoring strategy, which had been outlined in the Act and in the final environmental impact statement for the Project (USDA Forest Service 1999).
Indicator data were obtained from data sets, monitoring reports, and peer-reviewed papers provided by the Forest Service. These data were supplemented by information gathered during our interviews. The Panel was organized into five subject-area teams to address fire and forest ecology and management, socioeconomics, wildlife biology, and watershed science. Subteams functioned independently and provided analyses and conclusions for each Project goal. Inferences were debated among subteam members and then with the full Panel to ensure transparency and dependability of findings, as well as to identify issues common to multiple subject areas. A draft report was submitted it to the Forest Service for review and comment in July 2013. The final report was completed in December 2013 and submitted to the agency, members of Congress, and congressional staff (Pinchot Institute for Conservation 2013). Key findings from the report are summarized in the following sections.
To What Extent Did the Project Achieve the Intended Goals?
The pace and scale of the Project treatments did not meet expectations for wood fiber supply or the number of acres treated
The treatment goal was not consistently met. The Forest Service defines "accomplished treatments" as Projects offered and sold in a fiscal year. Accomplished treatments met the 40,000-acre goal in FY 2001 and FY 2004, but otherwise never exceeded 63% of this goal ( Figure 2 ). During the 13-year span of the Project, 242,000 acres were treated.
Moreover, the distribution of treatment types did not meet the original goals of the Act. The majority of the acres treated were derived from mechanical treatments to create DFPZs, followed by prescribed burning in DFPZs. Group selection, which was emphasized in the Act and the Community Stability Proposal as the primary source of sawlog production, was implemented on only 4,452 acres. The minimum goal for group selection treatments was 8,713 acres per year (Ͼ113,000 acres for all years of the Project). Group selection declined substantially after FY2005, whereas individual tree selection increased during the latter years of the Project.
The final environmental impact statement completed in 1999 for the Project estimated that the Project was capable of producing approximately 237,630 thousand cubic feet (CCF) (286.3 million board feet) of sawlogs and approximately 189,170 CCF of biomass annually. In comparison, sawlog production in the Project area was approximately 227,500 CCF in FY1990; production declined to 32,500 CCF in FY1998 (no estimates for biomass production for these years were available). Actual annual production from the Project averaged 28 and 37% of the estimated annual sawlog and biomass volumes, respectively ( Figure 3 ). A total of 856,210 CCF in sawlogs and 907,426 CCF in biomass were produced over the life of the Project (USDA Forest Service 2012). In addition, as indicated in Figure 3 , production of sawlogs and biomass varied widely from year to year. Average annual treatment costs were $1,212/acre (approximately $293.3 million to treat all 242,000 acres). We were not able to obtain costs for appeals and litigation. Revenue generated from the Project was $23.8 million.
The Project did not achieve the Community Stability Proposal goals of employment and community economic stability Based on the socioeconomic monitoring studies conducted by Jack Faucett Associates (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) and available data from USDA Forest Service databases, we found that the Project was unable to stem the rise in unemployment in local communities, thereby not attaining one of the key goals of the QLG's Community Stability Proposal. Between 1999 and 2009, forest products employment declined 60% from 1,741 to 701 jobs in local counties; no estimates were available for FY2011 (Jack Faucett Associates 2011) . Since 1999, four sawmills and one woody biomass cogeneration power plant closed in the project area. However, this decline was also probably influenced by the long-term and ongoing decline in forest products employment in the region, irrespective of this Project, and the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and related housing market downturn (Morgan et al. 2012 ). We did not analyze the causal factors affecting regional employment because these have been shown to be complex (Stimson et al. 2011) . Even before implementation of the Project, forest products-related employment was declining in these local communities (Jack Faucett Associates 2011) . The exception was in small sole proprietor businesses and private contractors (e.g., timber felling, vegetation management, and log-hauling operations). Employment associated with these entities increased from 299 to 333 jobs during course of the Project (Jack Faucett Associates 2011).
Beyond employment, local counties and communities in this area have historically relied on timber sale receipts to fund public services. Between 1986 and 1998, timber sale receipts in the five-county area (Lassen, Plumas, Shasta, Sierra, and Tehama) averaged $14.7 million annually. Receipts declined by more than 60% (to $5.8 million) between 2002 and 2011; no data were available for 1999 -2001 (Jack Faucett Associates 2011) .
Implementation of fuel management treatments typically reduced localized fire severity and had other benefits for fire suppression activities
During the Project time frame, 20 wildfires occurred within areas where DFPZ treatments had been implemented. Assessments of fire behavior for several wildland fires during the Project suggested that DFPZs consistently resulted in reduced fire severity (Murphy et al. 2010 ) such as reduced flame lengths, fire severity, average conditional burn probabilities, and fire size, which corroborated field and modeling studies for Sierra Nevada forests (Stephens and Moghaddas 2005 , Moghaddas et al. 2010 , Safford et al. 2012 . The influence on fire size was most notable near or in DFPZs; typically, fires were contained within 10 acres. DFPZs also enhanced suppression efforts by serving as anchor points for fireline construction, backfiring operations, and safe movement of firefighting personnel (Dailey et al. 2008 , Murphy et al. 2010 .
Silvicultural treatments, where implemented, appeared to result in allage, multistory, and fire-resilient stands, but it is uncertain how these treatments affected ecological integrity at the landscape level
The Act required uneven-aged forest management prescriptions to achieve a desired future condition of all-age, multistory, fireresilient forests. Large trees (Ͼ30 in. dbh) were normally protected from harvest, but mean canopy cover was reduced from 48 to 33% (Bigelow et al. 2012a ). Treatments initially reduced the number of snags, particularly in places where they posed safety hazards. The volume of large down wood (logs Ն10 in. in large-end diameter and Ն10 ft long) at most sites was below target levels and declined further after treatments because of mechanical destruction or prescribed burning (Bigelow et al. 2012a ).
Computational fire modeling yielded predictions of a decrease in mean conditional burn probability as well as a decrease in the potential for active and passive crown fires during moderate and extreme weather conditions for up to 5 years after treatment based on the observed forest structure (Bigelow et al. 2012a ). The models also showed that treatments did not decrease predicted surface fire behavior. Because group selec-tions are not specifically designed to meet fire objectives, they had low average crowns across stands, which are prone to scorch-related mortality for 20 years based on computational simulations. However, in eastside forests, fragmentation created by group selection may make the landscape less susceptible to crown fire (Bigelow et al. 2012b) .
Beyond stand-level metrics of forest structure and predicted fire behavior, there was a paucity of evidence about how treatments affected landscape-scale measures of ecological integrity. Stephens et al. (2014) found that although small mammal and songbird populations were largely unaffected by treatments in a portion of the Project area, California owl populations declined by 43%. Collins et al. (2011) conducted an analysis of fire dynamics from a landscapescale fuel treatment project outside the Project area, but using silvicultural methods similar to those used in the Project. Burn probabilities were considerably lower for up to 20 years after treatment compared with those for untreated areas. A similar landscape-scale assessment was not conducted for Project treatments.
California spotted owl nest and roost sites were protected, but the Project failed to assess adverse impacts to the owl population resulting from treatments At the time the Act passed, the effects of fuel reduction and group selection treatments on California spotted owls were unknown. Consequently, monitoring and evaluating these effects was paramount to address legal and public concerns. Unlike other objectives in the Project monitoring plan for assessing adverse impacts, there was substantial scientific information available to assess effects on California spotted owls. Demographic rates of reproduction, survival, and population change were estimated using state-of-the art analytical techniques (Keane et al. 2010 , Connor et al. 2013 . Although these baseline data were available to the Project monitoring team, they were not used to make critical assessments of adverse environmental impacts on California spotted owls throughout the Project time frame, despite an estimated 78% decline in the regional owl population between 1992 and 2010 (Keane et al. 2010) . Therefore, the relationship between the regional population decline and the Project remains unknown, although the study of Stephens et al. (2014) demonstrates a decline in owl populations where Project treatments occurred. Although it is possible that other factors also could have contributed to project areawide declines in owls (e.g., high-severity fire or short-term negative weather effects on reproduction), these effects were not evaluated in a comprehensive way so that the only reliable inference (sensu Romesburg 1981) about treatment effects stems from the work of Stephens et al. (2014) .
The Project monitoring team cited two reasons that this analysis was not completed: the size and precise location of treatments were not known, which prevented analysis of treatment effects; and the existing agency vegetation maps for the Project area were inaccurate, and new maps were not created in time to conduct the necessary analysis.
Water and soil resource impacts from Project activities were minimal at the site scale, but cumulative effects were unknown
Based on annual monitoring reports, best management practices (BMP) were consistently applied and found to protect aquatic and watershed resources at the site scale. The Project also funded watershed restoration actions, including the restoration of approximately 10,300 acres of wet meadow habitat and riparian areas, the elimination of 138 miles of road in riparian areas, and the restoration or elimination of 179 stream crossings. The effects of timber harvesting on water resources were monitored at only four sites. Increased sedimentation was reported for three of the four sites, leading to immediate impacts to aquatic macroinvertebrates in two sites. Monitoring the following year found recovery of the macroinvertebrates to preharvest levels in both sites (Mayes and Roby 2013) . Temporal and spatial watershed effects of Project activities on water quality and water quantity were not measured.
Treatments attained high compliance with three out of four site-level soil productivity standards as specified in the Land and Resource Management Plans for each national forest involved in the Project (Young et al. 2011) . The soil productivity standard lacking high compliance was large woody debris; the percentage of units in compliance with standards (Ͼ3 downed logs/acre) fell from 69.2% pretreatment to 43.0% posttreatment. Group selection resulted in statistically significant more soil compaction, topsoil displacement, and large woody debris reduction than other treatments (Young et al. 2011 ). Beyond these site-level assessments of BMP compliance and treatment impacts, cumulative impact assessments of activities on watershed functioning across the Project area and over the Project time frame were not conducted.
Although planning reduced some adverse environmental impacts, impacts to species of concern were uncertain because scientific evaluations were uneven, ineffective, or not completed There were many examples of sensitive bird and plant species or their habitats being protected adequately during treatment activities because of mitigation efforts (Burnett et al. 2012 ). However, insufficient monitoring design precluded determination of adverse impacts caused by treatments to focal species or species guilds, specifically the American marten (Martes americana) and amphibians. For example, the Record of Decision for the Project's final environmental impact statement specified no more than a 10% reduction in suitable habitat for old forest-dependent species relative to a baseline (USDA Forest Service 1999). Relative to this baseline, there was about a 2.2% loss of old forest due to Project activities, whereas wildfires ultimately contributed an additional 15.5% loss of old forest (Dillingham 2013) . Suitable habitat for American marten, a species of concern in the northern Sierra Nevada, has been linked to late seral stage forest (Zielinski et al. 2013) . The small percentage of loss from treatments suggested that there was a low risk of impact to American marten abundance and distribution. However, evaluation of the overall impacts to martens is unknown because the spatial configuration of habitat lost was not analyzed. This analysis is necessary to gauge the relative effect of treatments and fires on habitat connectivity, an attribute critical to American marten persistence (Hargis et al. 1999 ).
What Factors Affected Project Implementation and Outcomes?
We used interviews to further understand factors that affected Project implementation and outcomes and to place the Project's activities within broader ecological, social, economic, and policy contexts. Five key themes emerged from our interviews: (1) there were differing interpretations concerning the prescriptive intent of the Act; (2) there were changes in regional management direction affecting treatment location and design; (3) there were changing regional and national economic conditions compounding declines in the local forest industry; (4) there were appeals and litigation affecting the pace and scale of implementation; and (5) there was variation in forest conditions and uneven implementation of the Project across the three national forests.
Differing interpretations concerning the prescriptive intent the Act
The Act has been seen as being rigidly prescriptive by mandating silvicultural activities on a fixed range of acres annually (Owen 2002) . However, Forest Service line officers and staff, QLG members, and individuals with groups not participating in the QLG expressed different perspectives on the Act's prescriptive intent. For example, QLG members generally saw the Act as providing authority and resources to increase the pace and scale of treatments that Forest Service staff wanted to do; QLG members saw the Act as enabling action. Increasing the pace and scale of treatments would sustain a flow of wood products to area forest product facilities and sustain employment. Frustration over Forest Service treatment pace and scale was evident during both the 2007 and 2013 interviews, to the extent that the general sentiment among the group was that the Project was a failure. A related issue discussed below is how the Forest Service packaged projects in a way that raised costs and limited commercial timber production. QLG members did point out that, where treatments were implemented, they met the ecological intent of the Act in making forests more resilient to large-scale disturbances.
Conversely, during the 2007 interviews, Forest Service staff-field-level foresters in particular-saw the Act's acreage targets by silvicultural prescription as constraining their ability to make appropriate site-specific decisions based on existing forest structure. When the Forest Service did propose large-scale projects to increase the pace and scale of treatments, the proposals were appealed or litigated, forcing redesign by the agency planners to scale down the projects. In the 2013 interviews, many of the same Forest Service staff interviewed in 2007 expressed how they had learned to adapt the general principles embodied in the Act to fit to local ecological conditions and management contexts. By 2013, the Act was not seen as a prescriptive poison pill to swallow, but an opportunity to work through ideas about if, where, and how silvicultural treatments might be appropriate to meet broader landscape restoration and resilience goals, e.g., restoring historic forest structure and fire regimes.
For environmental organizations outside of the QLG, interviewees were opposed to having a legislative mandate to advance what was seen as a narrow definition of community stability by requiring timber production targets. For these stakeholders, the Act handcuffed the Forest Service to propose treatments in places where they were not appropriate and would result in adverse environmental impacts for the sake of producing timber volume. Interviewees also claimed that conformity to the Act's provisions caused the Forest Service to minimize or ignore input from outside the QLG to meet targets. As a result, treatment proposals pursuant to the Project received extra scrutiny and opposition.
Changing regional management direction
Management direction for Sierra Nevada national forests changed soon after Project implementation began. Foremost, the 2001 and 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendments created uncertainty in the early years of the Project due to changing management goals, standards, and guidelines between the 2001 and 2004 versions. Low harvest volumes in 2002 and 2003 were consistent with the 2001 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment and its diameter-limit restrictions on trees harvested. Total acres treated were Ͼ44,000 acres in FY2001 before declining to Ͻ25,000 acres per year in FY2002 and FY2003. Implementation was focused primarily on forests on the east side of the Sierra Nevada that had smaller diameter trees, lower wood volumes, and low economic value, but also had lower levels of social conflict than forests west of the Sierra Nevada crest. Sawlog and biomass volumes subsequently increased as a result of the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment, which permitted harvest of larger trees than allowed under the 2001 Record of Decision. Interviews with Forest Service line officers and staff and QLG members cited this change in management direction as a key factor affecting Project implementation; it was not until the 2007 Meadow Valley project that the Act's provisions were fully tested.
Compounding effects of regional and national economic conditions on the local forest industry QLG members and forest industry representatives attributed the decline in forest products-related employment during the early period of the Project to the 2001 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment's restrictions on timber harvesting in California spotted owl habitat. Three sawmills (Bieber, Loyalton, and Susanville) (Woodall et al. 2011) . Within the Project area, decreases in sawmill and operator capacity and lower market value of harvested material led to an increase in "no bid" sales, which effectively stalled Project implementation. Presumably, the decline in industry capacity affected national forest management and forest industry-related employment and economies in the broader Sierra Nevada, not just in the Project area.
Appeals and litigation affected the pace and scale of implementation
Appeals and litigation were widely cited by agency, industry, and community stakeholders as a primary reason for reduced implementation. Litigants frequently contested the science, prescriptions, and potential impacts during the early years of the Project, especially for group selection, which Forest Service personnel claimed was compounded by heightened attention generated by the Act and the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendments. To avoid appeal or litigation, Forest Service planners indicated that they postponed or rescaled several management proposals to avoid the need for a full environmental impact statement. Just the prospect of appeal or litigation motivated Forest Service staff to alter management proposals, effectively reducing the scope of proposals and often the size of trees harvested. Treatment areas were repeatedly remarked and resampled based on revised treatment objectives resulting from legal challenges or prolonged periods of inaction. Legal challenges also affected monitoring because activities requiring pre-and posttreatment sampling had to be revised or abandoned.
Over the 13-year life of the Project, 417 projects covering 242,000 acres were implemented. Forest Service records indicated that 20 projects were appealed, which repre-sented Ͻ5% of the total projects implemented. Six of the appeals proceeded to litigation. Although small in number, they represented high-profile cases that contributed to Forest Service planners' reluctance to increase the scale of projects. Litigation of the North 49 Project on the Lassen National Forest, the Empire Project on the Plumas National Forest, and the Phoenix Project on the Tahoe National Forest were specifically cited by Forest Service interviewees as having a "chilling effect" on subsequent treatment planning and implementation.
One new development that emerged from the 2013 interviews with Forest Service staff and line officers and with environmental stakeholders was the publication of An Ecosystem Management Strategy for Sierran Mixed-Conifer Forests (North et al. 2009 ), more commonly referred to as "GTR-220" based on its General Technical Report publication number designation per the USDA Forest Service Pacific Southwest Research Station's catalog system. This report presents an ecological restoration strategy based on a synthesis of available scientific research. The report was integral to increasing collaborative dialogue between some USDA Forest Service districts and environmental stakeholders, as it encompassed what was seen as a more science-informed, ecologically oriented goal than landscapescale fuel reduction.
A subsequent publication, Managing Sierra Nevada Forests (North 2012) , tiered off of GTR-220 by presenting additional summaries of scientific research pertaining to Sierra Nevada forest restoration and presenting case studies of collaborative planning and field implementation based on GTR-220 concepts. For the 2013 interviewees who highlighted this new development, these reports were critical to a path forward to planning and implementing proposals with stakeholders who had previously appealed and litigated management proposals. However, this increased collaboration did not result in a marked increase in timber volume produced or acreage treated.
Variation in forest conditions and uneven implementation across national forest units
According to Forest Service field-level foresters, the effects of past management on forest structure affected treatment planning and implementation. In many areas, the legacy of past harvesting and fire suppression created landscapes depleted of large living trees and snags and dominated by dense small-diameter trees. This constrained the location of suitable areas available for group selection as mandated by the Act. From our interviews, this was a primary point of contention between QLG members and the Forest Service. During the 2007 and 2013 interviews, QLG members asserted that the Forest Service was overly risk averse and structured projects in ways that favored service contracts over timber sales. Agency staff stated that they were reluctant to apply group selection in many areas due to what was seen as inappropriate forest conditions.
Differences also occurred regarding how Forest Service line officers, planning teams, and stakeholders across the three national forests and within a national forest evaluated treatment proposals, such as tree size class distributions, topography, economics, and wildlife habitat. Forest Service silviculturists noted the practical challenges involved with identifying suitable areas for group selection, so group selection was only considered for 0.57% of each planned treatment unit. The Act and the QLG's Community Stability Proposal intended group selection to occur on 0.57% of the total Project area. Although the distinction is subtle, it meant that group selection was considered for far fewer acres than intended (Figure 2) . Further, fewer acres were treated because harvest layout had to accommodate other many other factors (e.g., limited operating periods, accessibility, and merchantable volume). Stipulations from the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendments further constrained treatment location and design. Such variation in site-specific analyses across administrative units often constrained the scale of management activities, group selection in particular. In addition, Forest Service personnel noted that wildfires that burned within the Project area diverted human and financial resources from the Project to postfire salvage planning and operations, further reducing resources available for Project implementation.
We also observed that differences in institutional functioning and personnel between the national forests influenced the priority of Project management actions and, therefore, the willingness of administrators and senior staff to adjust workflow to align with the goals of the Act. Interviews with Forest Service personnel and QLG members suggested that the support of leadership or lack thereof in some cases was an important factor. Frequent changes in leadership at the forest level had a direct effect on planning priorities and allocation of resources; nine forest supervisors directed work on the three forests over the 13-year Project. The level of support and direction provided to staff for Project activities significantly influenced the pace and scale of implementation, relationships with the public, and the extent and quality of the monitoring.
Discussion and Implications
Based on our review, the Project produced mixed results relative to the Act's stated goals. Fuel reduction treatments reduced active fire behavior, reduced fire impact, and enhanced fire suppression efforts within treated areas. Silvicultural treatments increased structural complexity at the stand scale by protecting large trees and creating all-age, multistory stands (Figure 4 ). Watershed restoration projects were conducted with Project funding; these probably would not have occurred without the Project. However, a key goal of the Act and the Community Stability Proposal was to stabilize employment and attenuate negative local community social and economic impacts by generating a predictable, continuous supply of wood fiber. In this regard, annual targets for acres treated and sawlog and biomass volume produced consistently fell short; declines in wood product industry jobs as a whole and receipts to counties exhibited downward trends throughout the Project period.
This result is consistent with the results of Force et al. (1993) , who demonstrated a causal relationship between the decline in national forest timber production and declining employment at the community scale. However, other studies suggest a weak or nonexistent link between wood fiber supply and community stability (Freudenburg et al. 1998 , Berck et al. 2003 , citing broader regional, national, and global economic forces that affect forest industry-related employment, such as the 2007 global economic recession and declines in the housing market. This is clearly a complex relationship depending on the geographic scale of analysis (Carroll et al. 1999 , Freudenburg et al. 1999 . At the local community level, declining forest products-related employment and income can result in indirect impacts to national forest-reliant communities identified in other ways, such as declining K-12 school enrollments, increases in drug and alcohol abuse, loss of family support networks when people move out of the community, lack of affordable and quality health care, and an increase in poverty (Kusel et al. 2000, Kusel and Saah 2012) .
Changes in forest policy and management can have highly variable effects on forest-reliant communities ; these effects were not adequately assessed by the Project's socioeconomic monitoring program and are not generally included in conventional definitions of "community stability." Future programs to advance ecological and socioeconomic goals should include a commitment to long-term assessment of both community-level and regional impacts and include socioeconomic monitoring measures beyond employment to include community case studies that gauge broader measures of community wellbeing and change relative to national forest management , McLain et al. 2008 .
Our evaluation was also limited due to the lack of evidence about adverse environmental impacts because monitoring was often either not completed, useful, fully employed, or timely, especially regarding treatment effects on California spotted owls. Although the sufficiency and timeliness of monitoring is not an uncommon problem in natural resource management (Gardner 2010 , Biber 2011 , Schultz and Nie 2012 , this problem signaled that structural impediments existed within the Project despite the substantial financial investment of $324 million and has broader implications for the role of science and monitoring in collaborative adaptive management of national forests (Gutiérrez et al. 2015) . Several examples during the course of our review led us to question how monitoring was implemented, analyzed, and used to inform subsequent planning and management prescriptions and the adequacy of mechanisms for translating new knowledge into changes in management. Although some monitoring information suggested that mitigation measures were effective in limiting certain adverse impacts, information on impacts to California spotted owl and other sensitive species populations were wholly inadequate, issues for which USDA Forest Service management proposals are routinely appealed and litigated (Corbin 1999 , Schultz et al. 2013 .
That timely monitoring and adaptive management were missing for key environmental concerns during the Project signals a broader systemic issue for the USDA Forest Service because more recent policies, such as the Federal Landscape Restoration Act of 2009, which authorized the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP), and the 2012 national forest planning rule explicitly mandate robust collaborative monitoring and adaptive management programs , Larson et al. 2013 . It was apparent to us that many field-level USDA Forest Service staff and stakeholders embraced the oppor- tunity to increase monitoring to address uncertainties and conflicts. However, monitoring and adaptive management over the course of the Project did not receive unambiguous leadership commitment and support, an attribute Schultz et al. (2014) identify as being critical in their analysis of multiparty monitoring associated with the first 10 CFLRP projects. In addition, as was the case with this Project, formal administrative structures linking monitoring results with management decisionmaking are still lacking in CFLRP projects (Schultz et al. 2014 .
In the broad sense, the Act fell short of expectations because of the dynamic, complex interaction between national policy, regional forest management directives, variation in Project implementation among national forests and districts, and local biophysical, economic, and social-political contexts. Similar challenges in implementation of national-level forest policy have been noted. For example, in their analysis of stewardship contracting policy implementation, Moseley and Charnley (2014) suggested that "micro-processes" within local USDA Forest Service management units influenced how field staff implemented policies. Local line officers made choices according to their exposure to top-down political pressures, local biophysical and socioeconomic conditions, and internal unit dynamics, and this exposure varied from forest to forest and even from district to district (Moseley and Charnley 2014) .
Similarly, Sabatier et al. (1995) demonstrated that pressures from local constituencies and a preference for maintaining agency procedures influenced forest plan decisions, not top-down directives. Within national forest units, Stern et al. (2010) found that personnel are subject to competing preferences and accountability pressures when planning and analyzing management proposals. These field-level realities caused us to question the efficacy of top-down, "placebased" legislating of management activities for a specific geographic area to achieve particular outcomes and to resolve long-standing conflicts (Gutiérrez et al. 2015) . Nie and Fiebig (2010) raised similar questions regarding a proposed congressional bill to codify the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership's proposal.
In sum, the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act marked an experiment to address long-standing social, political, and legal conflicts over na-tional forest management. Although the prescriptive approach may have been well intended, it insufficiently accounted for the complex biophysical, management, social, and economic contexts within which national forest management occurs. Federal appropriations of Ͼ$324 million over 13 years were insufficient to overcome these challenges. More recent national forest policies and administrative initiatives have continued experimentation with mechanisms to overcome conflict and advance collaborative planning and implementation, such as permanent authorization of Stewardship Contracting, the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program, the 2012 national forest planning rule, and the expansion of Good Neighbor Authority. These directives are less prescriptive than the Act, provide more flexibility for field-level managers to account for local biophysical and socioeconomic contexts, and rely on collaborative engagement with stakeholders. However, with this increased flexibility come greater expectations to integrate monitoring and adaptive management to ensure that implementation and outcomes will be consistent with policy goals and societal expectations.
Endnotes

